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Abstract—Real-world deployments of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) require secure communication. It is important that a
receiver is able to verify that sensor data was generated by
trusted nodes. It may also be necessary to encrypt sensor data
in transit. Recently, WSNs and traditional IP networks are more
tightly integrated using IPv6 and 6LoWPAN. Available IPv6
protocol stacks can use IPsec to secure data exchange. Thus, it
is desirable to extend 6LoWPAN such that IPsec communication
with IPv6 nodes is possible. It is beneficial to use IPsec because
the existing end-points on the Internet do not need to be modified
to communicate securely with the WSN. Moreover, using IPsec,
true end-to-end security is implemented and the need for a
trustworthy gateway is removed.
In this paper we provide End-to-End (E2E) secure communi-
cation between IP enabled sensor networks and the traditional
Internet. This is the first compressed lightweight design, im-
plementation, and evaluation of 6LoWPAN extension for IPsec.
Our extension supports both IPsec’s Authentication Header (AH)
and Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP). Thus, communication
endpoints are able to authenticate, encrypt and check the
integrity of messages using standardized and established IPv6
mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks can be tightly integrated with
existing IP based infrastructures using IPv6 over Low Power
Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN). Sensor nodes
using 6LoWPAN can directly communicate with IPv6 en-
abled hosts and, for example, sensor data processing can
be performed by standard servers. Thus, 6LoWPAN greatly
simplifies operation and integration of WSNs in existing IT
infrastructures.
Real-world deployments of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) require secure communication. For instance, in a
smart meter application, the provider and the meters would
need to authenticate one another and encryption would be
desirable to ensure data confidentiality. IPv6 hosts in the
Internet support by default IPsec for secure communication.
Therefore, if data flows between IPv6 hosts and 6LoWPAN
sensor nodes it is desirable to take advantage of existing
capabilities and to secure traffic using IPsec. Thus, we propose
to add IPsec support to 6LoWPAN as illustrated by Figure 1.
IPsec defines an Authentication Header (AH) and an En-
capsulating Security Payload (ESP). The AH provides data
integrity and authentication while ESP provides data confi-
dentiality, integrity and authentication. Either AH, ESP or both
IPsec: end-to-end security
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Fig. 1: We propose to use IPsec to secure the communication
between sensor nodes in 6LoWPANs and hosts in an IPv6-
enabled Internet. IPsec provides E2E security using existing
methods and infrastructures.
can be used to secure IPv6 packets in transit. It is up to the
application to specify which security services are required.
6LoWPAN uses header compression techniques to ensure that
the large IPv6 and transport-layer headers (UDP/TCP) are
reduced. By supporting IPsec’s AH and ESP, additional IPv6
extension headers have to be included in each datagram. Thus,
it is important to ensure that compression techniques are as
well applied to these extension headers.
Independent of the achieved compression rates of AH and
ESP it is obvious that IPsec support in 6LoWPAN will increase
packet sizes as additional headers must be included. Note,
however, that by using IPsec we do not need to use existing
802.15.4 link-layer security mechanisms which in turn frees
some header space.
The main contributions of this paper are:
∙ 6LoWPAN-IPsec Specification: We give a specification
of IPsec for 6LoWPAN including definitions for AH and
ESP extension headers. Prior to this work no specification
for IPsec in the context of 6LoWPAN existed;
∙ 6LoWPAN-IPsec Implementation: We present the first
implementation of IPsec for 6LoWPAN networks. We
show that it is practical and feasible to secure WSN
communication using IPsec;
∙ 6LoWPAN-IPsec Evaluation: We evaluate the perfor-
mance of our IPsec 6LoWPAN implementation in terms
of code size, packet overheads and communication perfor-
mance. Our results show that overheads are comparable
to overheads of generally employed 802.15.4 link-layer
security while offering the benefit of true E2E security.
The paper proceeds by discussing related work followed by
a further motivating of using of IPsec. Then we present back-
ground knowledge on IPv6, IPsec and 6LoWPAN. Section V
describes our proposed integration of 6LoWPAN and IPsec.
After a thorough experimental evaluation of the performance
of our IPsec implementation, we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Message authentication and encryption in WSNs is gener-
ally performed using well known cryptographic mechanisms
such as block ciphers as part of standards-based protocols such
as IEEE 802.15.4. However, these mechanisms are difficult to
implement on resource constrained sensor nodes as crypto-
graphic mechanisms can be expensive in terms of code size
and processing speed. Furthermore, it is necessary to distribute
and maintain keys and it is difficult to implement efficient key
distribution protocols for resource constrained sensor nodes.
Thus, a lot of research work aims to reduce complexity of
cryptographic mechanisms, for example, TinyEEC [1] and
NanoEEC [2], or to simplify key distribution, for example,
Liu and Ning’s proposal for pairwise key predistribution [3]
and DHB-KEY [4]. These improvements make cryptographic
mechanisms in the context of WSNs more viable but an
important issue remains: a standardized way of implementing
security services is missing and for each deployment unique
customized solutions are created. Using the standardized
6LoWPAN as a vehicle to implement security services in form
of the proven and standardized IPsec offers a solution to this
problem. IPsec is currently available as part of some WSN
products, but does not provide a full E2E security solution.
One such example is the ArchRock PhyNET [5] that applies
IPsec in tunnel mode between the gateway and Internet hosts,
but still relies on link-layer security within the sensor network
thus breaking true E2E assurance. We are not aware of a
complete E2E implementation nor an evaluation of a working
system which we present in this paper.
The IEEE 802.15.4 [6] standard defines Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) message encryption and authentication on
the link-layer. The cryptographic algorithms could be executed
by specialized hardware within the transceiver chip. However,
link-layer security only protects messages while they travel
from one hop to the next as we discuss in Section III. Wood
and Stankovic [7] as well as Hu et al. [8] have demonstrated
performance gains when security operations are performed in
hardware. We expect similar performance gains when IPsec
operations are implemented in hardware. Granjal et al. argue
that IPsec is generally feasible in the context of WSN [9].
In their study they analyze the execution times and memory
requirements of cryptographic algorithms. Their work only
discusses performance of cryptographic algorithms but does
not describe how IPsec is actually integrated with 6LoWPAN.
In our work, we implement 6LoWPAN with compressed IPsec
and we analyze the performance of the overall system, not only
the performance of the cryptographic algorithms.
III. SECURING WSN COMMUNICATIONS
Researchers have unanimous consensus that security is very
important for the future IP based WSN and its integration with
the traditional Internet. IPv6 with potentially unlimited address
space is the obvious choice for these networks [10]. However,
security support for IP-based low power networks is still an
open issue, as mentioned in the 6LoWPAN specifications [11],
[12]. Actually, security can be guaranteed at different layers
of the IP protocol stack, resulting in solutions with various
compromises..
6LoWPAN today relies on the IEEE 802.15.4 (referred to
as 802.15.4 in the following) link-layer which provides data
encryption and integrity checking. This solution is appealing
since it is independent of the network protocols and is cur-
rently supported by the hardware of 802.15.4 radio chips.
However, such link-layer mechanism only ensures hop-by-
hop security where every node in the communication path
(including the 6LoWPAN gateway) has to be be trusted, and
where neither host authentication nor key management is
supported. Furthermore, messages leaving the sensor network
and continuing to travel on an IP network are not protected
by link-layer security mechanisms.
End-to-end security can be provided by the widely used
Transport Layer Security (TLS) standard. By operating be-
tween the transport-layer and the application-layer, it guar-
antees security between applications, includes a key exchange
mechanism and provides authentication between Internet hosts
in addition to confidentiality and integrity. As a counterpart,
TLS can only be used over TCP, which is rarely used in
wireless sensor networks. An adaptation of TLS for UDP
called DTLS is available, but it is not widely used.
The IPsec protocol suite, mandated by IPv6, provides end-
to-end security for any IP communication [13]. Like TLS and
unlike hop-by-hop solutions, it includes a key exchange mech-
anism and provides authentication in addition to confidentiality
and integrity. By operating at the network-layer, it can be used
with any transport protocols, including potential future ones.
Furthermore, it ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the
transport-layer headers (as well as the integrity of IP headers),
which cannot be done with a higher-level solution like TLS.
For these reasons, researchers [9], [14], [15] and 6LoWPAN
standardizations groups [12] consider IPsec a potential security
solution for IP based WSN.
In this paper we show that compressed IPsec is a sensible
and viable choice for 6LoWPANs. The key advantage of
using IPsec in WSN is that we achieve end-to-end IP based
communication between a sensor device and Internet hosts.
When using IPsec, the IEEE 802.15.4 security features can be
disabled as security services are provided in the IP layer. We
show later that when comparing link-layer security with IPsec,
packet sizes are similar.
IV. BACKGROUND
In this section we briefly outline core functionality of IPv6,
IPsec and 6LoWPAN that is relevant for the work presented in
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this paper. For more information we refer to the corresponding
RFCs: RFC2460 [16], RFC4301 [17] and RFC4944 [12].
A. IPv6 and IPsec
With the vision of the Internet of Things and Smart Objects
all kind of physical devices such as wireless sensors are ex-
pected to be connected to the Internet via IP [10]. This requires
the use of IPv6 [16], a new version of the Internet Protocol that
increases the address size from 32 bits to 128 bits. Besides the
increased address space IPv6 provides in comparison to IPv4
a simplified header format, improved support for extensions
and options, flow labeling capability and authentication and
privacy capabilities.
Authentication and privacy in IPv6 is provided by
IPsec [17]. IPsec defines a set of protocols for securing IP
communication: the security protocols Authentication Header
(AH) [18] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [19], the
algorithms for authentication and encryption, key exchange
mechanisms and so called security associations (SA) [17]. An
SA specifies how a particular IP flow should be treated in terms
of security. To establish SAs, IPSec standard specifies both
pre-shared key and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol.
This means that every node on IPv6 enabled conventional
Internet supports pre-shared key. In other words an imple-
mentation with pre-shared based SA establishment works
with any IPv6 node on Internet. Also, IKE uses asymmetric
cryptography that is assumed to be heavy weight for small
sensor nodes. However, it would be worth investigating IKE
with ECC for 6LoWPANs; we intend to do it in future.
The task of the AH is to provide connectionless integrity
and data origin authentication for IP datagrams and protection
against replays. A keyed Message Authentication Code (MAC)
is used to produce authentication data. The MAC is applied to
the IP header, AH header and IP payload. The authentication
header is shown in Figure 2. All hosts must support at least
the hash-based message authentication code algorithm AES-
XCBC-MAC-96 [20] to calculate authentication data that has
a size of 12 bytes. Thus, as shown in Figure 2, a basic AH
header has a size of 24 bytes.
ESP [19] provides origin authenticity, integrity, and con-
fidentiality protection of IP packets. ESP is used to encrypt
the payload of an IP packet but in contrast to AH it does
not secure the IP header. If ESP is applied the IP header
is followed by the ESP IP extension header which contains
the encrypted payload. ESP includes an SPI that identifies
the SA used, a sequence number to prevent replay attacks,
the encrypted payload, padding which may be required by
Fig. 3: The LOWPAN IPHC Header.
some block ciphers, a reference to the next header and op-
tional authentication data. Encryption in ESP includes Payload
Data, Padding, Pad Length and Next Header;Authentication,
if selected, includes all header fields in the ESP. If we assume
mandatory AES-CBC as encryption algorithm an ESP with
perfect block alignment will have an overhead of 18 bytes
(10 bytes for ESP and 8 bytes for Initialization Vector). If
additional authentication using AES-XCBC-MAC-96 is used
the ESP overhead is 30 bytes, as the minimum length of AES-
XCBC-MAC-96 is 12 bytes.
The protocols AH and ESP support two different modes:
transport mode and tunnel mode. In transport mode IP header
and payload are directly secured as previously described.
In tunnel mode, a new IP header is placed in front of the
original IP packet and security functions are applied to the
encapsulated (tunneled) IP packet. In the context of 6LoWPAN
tunnel mode seems not practical as the additional headers
would further increase the packet size.
B. 6LoWPAN
6LoWPAN [12] aims at integrating existing IP based infras-
tructures and sensor networks by specifying how IPv6 packets
are to be transmitted over an IEEE 802.15.4 network. The
maximum physical-layer packet size of 802.15.4 packet is
127 bytes and the maximum frame header size is 25 bytes.
An IPv6 packet has therefore to fit in 102 bytes. Given that
packet headers of a packet would already consume 48 bytes of
the available 102 bytes it is obvious that header compression
mechanisms are an essential component of the 6LoWPAN
standard.
HC13[21] proposes context aware header compression
mechanisms: the LOWPAN IPHC (referred to as IPHC in
the following) encoding for IPv6 header compression and
the LOWPAN NHC (referred to as NHC in the following)
encoding for the next header compression. The IPHC header
is shown in Figure 3.
For efficient IPv6 header compression, IPHC removes safely
IPv6 header fields that are implicitly known to all nodes in
the 6LoWPAN network. The IPHC has a length of 2 byte
of which 13 bits are used for header compression as shown
in Figure 3. Uncompressed IPv6 header fields follow directly
the IPHC encoding in the same order as they would appear
in the normal IPv6 header. In a multihop scenario IPHC can
compress the IPv6 header to 7 bytes The NH field in the IPHC
indicates whether the next header following the basic IPv6
header is encoded. If NH is 1, NHC is used to compress the
next header. 6LoWPAN specifies that the size of NHC should
be multiple of octets, usually 1 byte where first variable length
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bits represents a NHC ID and the remaining bits are used to
encode/compress headers. 6LoWPAN already defines NHC for
UDP and IP Extension Header [21].
V. 6LOWPAN AND IPSEC
IPsec requires header compression to keep packet sizes
reasonable in 6LoWPAN. Unfortunately, there are no header
encodings specified for AH and ESP extension headers. In this
section we therefore propose these extension header encod-
ings. We evaluate our savings in terms of packet size later in
Section VI. At the end of this section, we also discuss further
improvements that would be possible by small, standard-
compliant modifications of the end hosts where there is need
for cryptographic algorithms that could handle 6LoWPAN
UDP compression.
A. LOWPAN NHC Extension Header Encoding
As previously described, HC13 defines context aware header
compression using IPHC for IP header compression and NHC
for the next header compression. The already defined NHC
encoding form for IP extension headers can be used to encode
AH and ESP extension headers. NHC encodings for the IPv6
Extension Headers consist of a NHC octet where three bits
(bits 4,5,6) are used to encode the IPv6 Extension Header ID
(EID). This NHC EH encoding for extension headers is shown
in Figure 4.
Out of eight possible values for the EID, six are specified
by the HC13 draft. The remaining two slots (101 and 110)
are currently reserved. We propose to use the two free slots to
encode AH and ESP. Also, it is necessary to set the last bit in
IPv6 extension header encoding to 1 to specify that the next
header (AH or ESP) is encoded as well using NHC.
B. LOWPAN NHC AH Encoding
We define the NHC encoding for the AH. Our proposed
NHC for AH is shown in Figure 5.
We describe the function of each header field:
∙ The first four bits in the NHC AH represent the NHC ID
we define for AH, and are set to 1101. These are needed
to comply with 6loWPAN standard.
Source Address
Octet 0 Octet 1 Octet 2 Octet 3
Destination Address
Source Port
6Low
PAN
Header
Dest Port
DATA Payload (Variable)
LOWPAN_IPHC Hop Limit
Source Address LOWPAN_NHC_EH
LOWPAN_NHC_AH Sequence Number
LOWPAN_NHC_UDP
ICV
Fig. 6: Example of a compressed IPv6/UDP packet using AH
∙ PL: If 0, the payload lengths is omitted. This length can
be obtained from the SPI value because the length of the
authenticating data depend on the algorithm used and are
fixed for any input size. If 1, the length is carried inline
after the NHC AH header
∙ SPI: If 0, the default SPI for the sensor network is used
and the SPI field is omitted. We set the default SPI value
to 1. This does not mean that all nodes use the same
security association (SA), but that every node has its own
preferred SA, identified by SPI 1. If 1, the SPI is carried
inline
∙ SN: If 0, a 16 bit sequence number is used and the left
most 16 bits are assumed to be zero. If 1, all 32 bits of
the sequence number are carried inline.
∙ NH: If 0, the next header field in AH will be used to
specify the next header and it is carried inline. If 1, the
next header field in AH is skipped. The next header will
be encoded using NHC.
The minimum length of a standard AH supporting the
mandatory HMAC-SHA1-96 is 24 bytes. After optimal com-
pression we obtain a header size of 16 bytes. Figure 6 shows
compressed IPv6/UDP packet secured with AH with HMAC-
SHA1-96.
C. LOWPAN NHC ESP Encoding
Also the NHC encoding for ESP encodes the security
parameter index, the sequence number, the next header fields
and the NHC ID for ESP. In the case of ESP, we propose
1110 as NHC ID while we propose 1101 as NHC for AH as
shown in Figure 6. Due to space limitation, we do not detail
these encoding for ESP which are available in full details in
a technical report [22].
Recall that the minimum ESP overhead without authenti-
cation, AES-CBC and perfect block alignment is 18 bytes.
After optimal compression this header overhead is reduced to
12 bytes. ESP with authentication (HMAC-SHA1-96) has an
overhead of 30 bytes which is reduced to 24 bytes using the
outlined ESP compression.
D. Combined Usage of AH and ESP
It is possible to use AH and ESP in combination; obviously
the defined AH and ESP compression headers can be used in
succession. However, it is more efficient in terms of header
sizes to use ESP with authentication option than to apply AH
and ESP to a packet. As packet sizes are important in the
System ROM (kB) RAM (kB)
overall diff overall diff
Without IPsec 32.9 – 8.0 –
AH with HMAC-SHA1-96 36.8 3.9 9.1 1.1
AH with XCBC-MAC-96 38.4 5.5 8.5 0.5
ESP with AES-CBC 41.4 8.5 8.3 0.3
ESP with AES-CTR 39.8 6.9 9.1 0.3
ESP with AES-XCBC-MAC-96 39.8 6.9 8.3 0.3
ESP with AES-CBC +
AES-XCBC-MAC-96 41.9 9.0 8.3 0.3
ESP with AES-CBC +
AES-XCBC-MAC-96 41.9 9.0 8.3 0.3
TABLE I: Memory footprints show that AH and ESP con-
sumes just 3.9kB and 9kB for mandatory IPsec algorithms
context of WSNs we expect that this IPsec option will not be
used in practice.
E. End Host Requirement
AH capable 6LoWPAN nodes can directly communicate
with unmodified IPsec hosts on conventional Internet. When
ESP is used 6LoWPAN nodes can as well communicate
directly with unmodified IPsec hosts. However, if ESP is
used it is not possible to compress upper layer headers such
as UDP. A 6LoWPAN gateway between sensor network and
IP network cannot access and expand the encrypted UDP
header. To enable UDP compression with ESP we need to
specify a new encryption algorithm for ESP which is able to
perform UDP header compression and encryption. Again, if
this optimization is used IPsec hosts must include and support
this encryption protocol.
VI. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
In this section we quantify performance of the proposed
IPSec extensions for 6LowPAN. After describing our imple-
mentation and experimental setup, we evaluate the impact
of IPsec in terms of memory footprint, packet size, energy
consumption and performances under different configurations.
A. Implementation and Experimental Setup
We implement IPsec AH and ESP for the Contiki operating
system [23]. The implementation required the modification
of the existing Contiki 𝜇IP stack which already provides
6LoWPAN functionality. The Contiki 𝜇IP stack is used on
the sensor nodes and on a so called soft bridge connecting
WSN and the Internet. In addition to the IPsec protocol, we
implement the IPsec/6LoWPAN compression mechanisms as
outlined in the previous section. We support the NHC EH,
NHC AH, and NHC ESP encodings (see Section V) at the
SICSLoWPAN layer, the 6LoWPAN component of the 𝜇IP
stack.
We use the SHA1 and AES implementations from MIRACL
[24], an open source library, and implement all cryptographic
modes of operation needed for authentication and encryption
in IPsec. For AH, we implement the mandatory HMAC-SHA1-
96 and AES-XCBC-MAC-96. For ESP, we implement the
mandatory AES-CBC for encryption and HMAC-SHA1-96 for
authentication. Additionally, in ESP, we implement the op-
tional AES-CTR for encryption and AES-XCBC-MAC-96 for
authentication. Our Contiki IPsec 6LoWPAN implementation
uses pre-shared keys to establish SAs which work with any
IPv6 node on Internet as a pre-shared mechanism is mandatory
in IPsec. Manual key distribution, however, is currently also
used for traditional 802.15.4 link-layer security.
Our evaluation setup shown in Figure 1 consists of four
Tmote Sky [25] sensor nodes, a 6LoWPAN soft bridge (imple-
mented by a fifth Tmote) nd a Linux machine running Ubuntu
OS with IPsec enabled. The four sensor nodes on the right side
in Figure 1 form a multihop network. They execute a single
application that listens to a fixed UDP port. When a packet is
received, it is processed by the 6LoWPAN layer, interpreted
by the IPsec layer and by 𝜇IP. Then its payload is forwarded to
the application. As a reply, a new datagram of the same size
is sent back, following the opposite process. Thus, IPsec is
used to secure the end-to-end (E2E) communication between
the sensor node and the Internet host. To avoid the delay of
a duty-cycled MAC layer, we use Contiki’s NullMAC in the
experiments and hence all nodes keep their radio turned on all
the time.
B. Memory footprint
We measure the ROM and RAM footprint of our IPsec
implementation. Table I compares IPsec AH and IPsec ESP
using the multiple modes of operation we implemented. The
footprints are compared with a reference Contiki system
including uIP and SICSLoWPAN.
The ROM footprint overhead ranges from 3.8 kB (AH with
HMAC-SHA1) to 9 kB (ESP with AES-CBC + AES-XCBC-
MAC). This always keeps the system footprint under 48 kB,
the Flash ROM size of the Tmote Sky. It is worth mentioning
that unlike AES-CBC, the AES-CTR mode of operation only
relies on AES encryption. Thus, the AES-CTR + AES-XCBC-
MAC-96 configuration can be implemented without AES
decryption, resulting in a particularly low memory footprint.
The RAM footprint is calculated as the sum of the global
data and the runtime stack usage that we measure by running
Contiki in the MSPSim emulator [26]. With an additional
footprint of 1.1 kB, the AH HMAC-SHA1 configuration is
the most RAM-consuming configuration. When using other
modes of operation, the RAM usage lies between only 0.3
and 0.5 kB. These results show that both IPsec AH and ESP
can be embedded in constrained devices while leaving space
for applications.
C. Packet Overhead Comparison
Currently WSN communication is secured using 802.15.4
link-layer security. This security mechanism can only provide
hop-by-hop security and, in contrast to IPsec, lacks the ability
to provide proper E2E security. Nevertheless, we provide here
a comparison of packet overheads between 802.15.4 link-layer
security and IPsec security. Table II summarizes the packet
overhead when using uncompressed IPsec, compressed IPsec
and 802.15.4 link-layer security.
Service Uncompressed IPsec Compressed IPsec 802.15.4Mode Bytes Mode Bytes Mode Bytes
AH Authentication HMAC-SHA1-96 24 HMAC-SHA1-96 16 AES-CBC-MAC-96 12
ESP Encryption AES-CBC 18 AES-CBC 12 AES-CTR 5
ESP Encryption and
Authentication
AES-CBC and
HMAC-SHA1-96
30 AES-CBC and
HMAC-SHA1-96
24 AES-CCM-128 21
TABLE II: With compressed IPsec, packet sizes are similar to 802.15.4 while IPsec provides end-to-end security.
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Fig. 7: The comparison of our implemented algorithms shows
that among the ones specified in the standards, AES-CBC
and AES-XCBC-MAC-96 are the most efficient in terms
of processing time and energy consumption. They are also
mandatory and the most secure.
When using link-layer security, the packet overhead for the
authentication scheme is exactly the length of the MAC. In
IPsec when using AES-XCBC-MAC-96, the MAC has a length
of 12 bytes. The additional AH header fields increase the
overhead to 24 bytes. Thanks to the IPsec header compression
we defined, this overhead is reduced to 16 bytes. The ability
to provide E2E authentication with IPsec has hence a cost of
4 bytes compared to the 802.15.4 baseline which provides only
hop-by-hop security.
If only message encryption is required, the 802.15.4 link-
layer security provides AES-CTR which has a 5 bytes over-
head. In comparison, IPsec with ESP and AES-CBC leads to
an overhead of 18 bytes, reduced to 12 bytes thanks to header
compression. Here, the ability to provide E2E encryption with
IPsec has a cost of 7 bytes compared to the 802.15.4 baseline.
With AES-CCM-128, the overhead for 802.15.4 is 21 bytes
while IPsec ESP has an overhead of 30 bytes, reduced to
24 bytes when using our 6LoWPAN compression extension.
The ability to provide E2E encryption and authentication with
IPsec has hence a cost of 3 bytes compared to the 802.15.4
baseline.
Moreover, when carrying large IP datagrams, link-layer
fragmentation has to be used. With link-layer security, one
pays the header overheads for every fragment. In contrast, the
IPsec header is included only once for all the fragments of
a single datagram. This means that as soon as two or more
fragments are needed, IPsec offers a lower header overhead
than 802.15.4 link-layer security.
D. Performance of Cryptography
We evaluate the efficiency of the different cryptographic
algorithms and modes supported by our IPsec implementation.
Figure 7 details the performances and energy consumption
for each mode of operation and depending on the size of
the IP payload. The authentication algorithms are compared
separately for AH and ESP: with AH the MAC is calculated
over the IP header and payload packet, while in ESP the IP
header is neither encrypted nor authenticated.
Our results show that for encryption, AES-CBC and AES-
CTR have similar performances and energy consumption.
Regarding authentication, the cost is as expected higher for
AH than for ESP because of the processing of the 40 byte IP
header. In all cases, the energy consumption has a fixed-cost
and grows linearly with the data size. HMAC-SHA1-96 is not
as efficient as other solutions because of its particularly high
fixed-cost when data sizes are small.
The proposed standard for Cryptographic Suites for IPsec
specifies that the future IPsec systems will use AES-CBC-128
for encryption and AES-XCBC-MAC-96 mode for authenti-
cation [27]. Figure 7 shows that these are also
E. System-wide Energy Overhead
Securing the Internet of Things has a cost in terms of added
energy usage. We measure the energy overhead of the available
security options on the Tmote Sky using Contiki’s integrated
energy estimator. We measure the total number of CPU ticks
from the reception of the first fragment of a message, when
starting link layer decryption. We stop counting when the link
layer encryption of the last packet is finished, but we ignore
the network time between the packets. In total we the link
layer processing, 6LoWPAN processing, 𝜇IP stack handling,
and application-layer processing. These experiments are run
with and without hardware support. For the
Figure 8 shows the energy consumption of Link Layer
security only, IPsec using either AH or ESP, and without
using any security. Since the variance of the 20 runs was
very low, it is not not shown. The results show that ESP
consumes more energy than AH; this is because for ESP we
use both authentication and encryption. Although the energy
consumption with IPsec is significantly higher than without
IPsec we argue that this is negligible when compared to the
consumption of typical radio chips. In the worst measured
case, AH on 64 bytes, the energy consumed is around 0.5 mJ.
The radio chip of the Tmote Sky consumes the same amount
of energy after 8 ms of idle listening.
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Fig. 9: Response time versus datagram size with AH, ESP and without IPsec. ESP is faster than AH for small datagrams
because it does not process the 40 bytes IP header. AH is faster than ESP for large datagrams because it processes authentication
but no encryption.
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(a) Multi Hop with 16 bytes data size
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Fig. 10: Response time versus number of hops with AH, ESP and without IPsec. The overhead of IPsec is constant across a
single hop and a multihop network.
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Fig. 8: Node energy consumption is lower without IPsec and
higher for ESP than for AH. Compared to other activities e.g.
idle listening it is not significant.
F. System-wide Response Time Overhead
We measure and evaluate the response time for different
data sizes with IPsec and without IPsec. The response time
is the time it takes to send a message from an IP connected
Linux machine to a sensor node and to receive a response.
We conduct experiments using a routing distance in the WSN
ranging from 1 to 4 hops and for IP datagrams with a size
ranging from 16 to 512 bytes. We execute every experiment
10 times.
Figure 9 shows the response time in dependency of the
IP datagram size. When the datagram size is too large to fit
a single 802.15.4 packet, the data are fragmented according
to the 6LoWPAN standard. Consistently with the mirco-
benchmarks in Figure 7, the overhead of IPsec grows linearly
with datagram sizes. We observe that for small sizes, ESP
is faster than AH. This is because unlike AH, ESP does not
process the full 40 bytes IP header. With larger sizes, AH is
faster than ESP, because it ensures authentication only, while
ESP authenticates plus encrypts and decrypts the messages.
Figure 10 shows the response times obtained in dependence
of hop distance. For a given data size, we observe that the
overhead of either AH or ESP is constant, whatever the number
of hops. This is because, for the intermediate nodes, the cost
of forwarding the data with and without IPsec is the same; the
overhead is only due to computation on the end nodes. In the
worst case (512 bytes), we measured an overhead of 261 ms.
G. Improvements Using Hardware Support
The efficiency of IPSec can be improved by employing
cryptographic functions provided by sensor node hardware.
For example, the CC2420 radio chip present on many sensor
node platforms provides such functionality. To investigate pos-
sible improvements we extend our prototype implementation
to use this hardware for the required AES computations.
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the impact of hardware supported
cryptography on the achievable response time. In all cases
hardware-based implementations are faster than pure software
implementations. When processing 512 byte datagrams over
a single hop the overhead of pure software AH is 65 %
which decreases to 12 % with the help of the cryptographic
coprocessor. For ESP the decrease ranges from 64 % to 37 %.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
WSNs will be an integral part of the Internet and IPv6
and 6LoWPAN are the protocol standards that are expected
to be used in this context. IPsec is the standard method to
secure Internet communication and we investigate if IPsec can
be extended to sensor networks. Towards this end, we have
presented the first IPsec specification and implementation for
6LoWPAN. We have extensively evaluated our implementation
and demonstrated that it is possible and feasible to use
compressed IPsec to secure communication between sensor
nodes and hosts in the Internet.
To securely communicate with any IPv6 enabled node
on the Internet pre-shared keys are sufficient but not very
flexible. Therefore, we plan to investigate if an automatic key
exchange protocol for 6LoWPANs based on IPsec’s Internet
Key Exchange protocol (IKE) is feasible.
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